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Abstract
This study deals with the way in which macro-economic conditions, political and economic stability, and
economic incentives influence FDI flows to Mexico. Specifically, the model examines the effect of Salinas'
policy initiatives on FDI in Mexico.
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Political and Macroeconomic Determinants
of Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico
Yuet-Wei Wan
INTRODUCTION

Over the last decade, Mexico's economy has been undergoing a
series of exciting changes. In 1983, Mexico was still a highly
inward-oriented economy with a government that was outspoken in
its criticism of multinational cooperations. Today, Mexico ranks
among the most outwardly-oriented developing economies of the
world (Nunez p. 7). The present administration, under the
leadership of President Salinas, has implemented significant
changes aimed at liberalizing Mexico's policy towards foreign
direct investment (FDI). The changes in Mexico's policy have been
largely in response to the 1982 debt crisis and deteriorating
economic conditions. This study deals with the way in which
macro-economic conditions, political and economic stability1, and
policy incentives influence FDI flows to Mexico. Specifically,
the model examines the effect of Salinas' policy initiatives on
FDI in Mexico.
Research in this area is meaningful for many reasons. First,
being the world's fifteenth largest economy, Mexico is clearly an
important member of today's global economy. Over the last few
decades, Mexico's economy has been experiencing impressive growth
rates. In 1975, Mexico's real gross domestic product (GDP) grew
by 5.7%.
In the early 1980s, real growth rates were between 8% and
9%. In 1982 however, the real growth rate plunged to an alarming
4%. In recent years, the growth rate has been between 1.87% in
1987 and 3.98% in 1990. Some of the slowdown in GDP growth rates
can be attributed to the debt crisis in 1982. Mexico also has its
share of economic problems. Many of the recent economic reforms,
including the change in Mexico's policies towards FDI, have been
in response to the sudden slowdown. Nevertheless, Mexico's
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economy has still been doing relatively well. As such, it is
hardly surprising that Mexico is among the largest recipients of
FDI from the industrialized nations. Over the period from 19551982, Mexico received over $13.44 billion in FDI (Nunez p. 17).

Graph 1 : FDI vs GROWTH
Mexico, 1971-1990
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From the above graph, it is reasonably clear that there is a positive
relationship between growth and FDI. This supports the findings of this
study.

FDI flows to Mexico are expected to continue to grow rapidly
over the next decade. Part of this is due to the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the United States, Canada
and Mexico. Among these three nations, Mexico has the comparative
advantage in low-skill, labor intensive production. Under the
auspices of NAFTA, multinational enterprises can set up cost
efficient production facilities in Mexico and have access to the
vast US and Canadian markets as well.
The decision to engage in FDI is a long and deliberate
process. It is a decision that involves a long term commitment of
the multinational corporation's time, effort and resources. There
are many factors that need to be taken into consideration. Not
all of these factors are economic in nature, In fact, one of the
primary considerations is political risk. Clearly, a nation that
is likely to experience a coup is not a viable location for FDI.
As such, any model that does not attempt to model political and
economic stability would be incomplete.
This study incorporates the effects of government policy on
FDI. The current stance of Mexico's policy makers on this issue
cannot be more different than it was two decades ago, when the
"Law for the promotion of Mexican Investment and Regulation of
Foreign Investment" of 1973 was passed. This piece of legislation
The Park Place Economist

severely restricted foreign ownership rights in Mexico. Since his
election in 1988, President Salinas has implemented various
policies aimed,specifically at attracting foreign capital. In a
recent interview with Forbes, Salinas states " We know we have to
be competitive [in tax rates] on an international level if we are
to compete for capital, which in the Nineties will be the key
question for economic success or failure" (p. 64). Among other
things, Mexico does not tax capital gains. Given this radical
about-face in policies towards FDI, Mexico is the ideal candidate
for this study of the effect of the government's policy stance on
FDI flows.
11. L i t e r a t u r e R e v i e w

There exists a vast body of literature that pertains to the
FDI decision process. Over twenty years ago, Stephen Hymer
pioneered work in this area with his seminal thesis on FDI and
multinational enterprises. Since then, research in this area has
taken off in many directions. Today, literature on FDI and the
multinational corporation crosses disciplines. Substantial work
on this subject can be found among the literature on
international economics, international business, and finance.
Most of the existing research concentrates heavily on the
micro-economic considerations behind an individual firm's
decision to invest abroad. Although these studies are not
directly related to my research, they provide the micro-economic
foundation upon which I can build my macro-economic model. My
base model was put together under the guidance of Dr. Jian Hai
Lin from the International Monetary Fund, He has conducted a
similar study on Malaysia and Singapore. Dr. Lin discovered that
in Malaysia, a sophisticated and relatively low cost labor force
is of primary importance in attracting FDI. In his study, the
impact of government policy incentives on FDI in Malaysia seemed
to play a minimal role. In Singapore however, Dr. Lin discovered
that FDI flows are positively related to incentives and
inversely related to relative labor costs and inflation rates (p.
44).
My literature search was conducted in three stages. First, I
looked for past theoretical and empirical work that supports the
inclusion of the variables in my base model. Then, I researched
past work on political risk assessment. Concurrently, I also
looked for research related to the effects of government policy
incentives on FDI flows.
According to Dr. Lin, the growth rate of the market,
relative labor costs, net exports, government debt, and inflation
are important determinants of FDI. In the literature, there is
much support for the importance of the growth rate of the market.
Daniels and Radebaugh point out that one of the primary motives
for investing abroad is to gain market access (p. 194). Dr. Lin
found that the growth rate of the market (GDP growth) is a key
variable in explaining FDI in Singapore and Malaysia (p. 59). In
theory, the multinational corporation (MNC) need not set up a
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plant inside a country in order to gain access to its market. The
MNC can also gain market access by licensing and exporting.
However, there are other real world considerations that often
render these options unrealistic. An important example is
transportation costs. For some products, the cost of
transportation makes it impractical to export the good over any
great distance. Other factors include trade barriers and
consumers' preference for domestically produced goods (Daniels
and Radebaugh, p. 195-197).
Daniels and Radebaugh identify production costs as another
important determinant of FDP. The realities of competing in a
global marketplace make it necessary for MNCs to seek out the
most cost efficient sources of raw materials and factors of
production (p. 194). An empirical study by Cushman on the effects
of real wages and labor productivity on FDI failed to support the
theory that real wages are an important determinant of FDI in the
US. Richard Caves argues that the decision to undertake FDI is a
function of the cost of home production relative to the cost of
foreign production. Since global financial markets are very
integrated, capital has become very mobile. It is not so with
labor. As such, the country with a comparative advantage in low
cost labor will be a net recipient of foreign capital (Caves, p.
21).
In the literature, there is disagreement over the effect of
the trade balance on FDI. The political risk assessment
literature identifies the trade balance as an indicator of a
country's political and economic stability. Persistently high
trade deficits can result in the restriction of foreign exchange
transfers. This inhibits the ability of the MNC to repatriate its
profits. The government may also attempt to reduce imports by
devaluing the local currency or by restricting imports of certain
goods. MNCs often depend on external sources for their inputs to
production. As such, a devaluation of the local currency
increases production costs as intermediate goods become more
expensive. Similarly, import restrictions raise production costs
or impede production. In this sense, a high trade deficit
discourages FDI (Bunn and Mustafaoglu, p. 1565-66).
It is also argued that a high trade deficit weakens the
country's currency. On the one hand, this makes it more expensive
for MNCs to import intermediate goods. On the other hand a weaker
currency should stimulate demand for the country's exports,
stimulate production and consequently, raise income and improve
the population's purchasing power (Madura, p. 484). As such, the
MNC will be able to sell more of its products both within the
country and export more to the rest of the world. In this sense,
a high trade deficit may be appealing to foreign investors.
Clearly, the literature does not tell us whether a high trade
deficit should be considered an indication of economic stability
or economic instability.
Another important indicator of economic stability is the
external debt level. This is very closely related to the trade
deficit in that a sustained trade deficit year after year
The Park Place Economist

contributes to the external debt level. The external debt figure
includes government and private debt. A high government debt
level discourages FDI. This is especially true if the government
is an important customer of the MNC in that a large debt may
curtail the purchasing power of the government and hence harm the
profitability of the MNC (Madura p. 484). High private debt
levels are also harmful in that they contribute to the overall
level of external debt. A high external debt level does not
inspire confidence in investors in that there is a higher risk of
the country defaulting on its external obligations. This does not
help the country's economy or the MNC's profitability. This was
exactly the case with Mexico in the 1982 debt crisis. Mexico's
high external debt (refer to Graph 2) level can be linked to the
plunge in the real GDP growth rate (refer to Graph 1) and the
decrease in FDI to Mexico.
I- - - -

GRAPH 2 : FDI vs. DEBT
Mexico, 1971-1990
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The graph suggests that the relationship between external debt and FDI is
somewhat ambiguous. From 1975-1981, the appears to be a positive
relationship. The opposite is true for all other years. Model A supports the
positive relationship. DEBT is probably not a good proxy for stability.

Finally, inflation is significant because inflation affects
the purchasing power of consumers and as a result, consumer
demand for the MNC's products (Madura p. 482). Nunez points out
that inflation also pushes up the costs of production and may eat
into the profits that an MNC hopes to repatriate (p. 31). Dr Lin
also found that inflation is a key explanatory variable of FDI in
Malaysia and Singapore (p. 59).
111. The Base Model
The first step in this study is to estimate the base model.
The base model uses macro-economic variables to explain FDI into
Mexico. It does not include the government policy variable. The
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base model is important because the final model can then be
compared with it. The comparison may yield some insights as to
the effects of the government policy variable on FDI. The base
model also gives an initial indication of how well the final
model can be expected to explain FDI in Mexico.
FDI in Mexico is hypothesized to be a function of real GDP
growth, relative labor costs, net exports, government deficit and
inflation :
FDI = f(GROWTH, INF, LABOR-US/MEX, NET-EXP, DEBT)
The empirical model is as follows :
FDI = a

+

b * GROWTH + c * INF + d * LABOR-US/MEX
NET-EXP + f * DEBT + error

+

e

*

Table 1 describes the variables. The data are time series from
1971-1990. Where applicable, all variables are measured in real
terms. Data for unit labor costs for both the US and Mexico are
not available for 1989 and 1990. As such, OLS regressions of US
unit labor cost and Mexico's unit labor cost as functions of time
were run. The data for 1989 and 1990 are extrapolated from the
results of the regression2.

TABLE 1 : DEFINITION OF VARIABLES

I

VAR'ABLE
FDI

GROWTH

1

I

I
1
lTYPE

I

DEFINITION

I

I

Dependent

Mexico's total real foreign direct investment

II

I

I

I

1

Macro-economic % annual growth in Mexico's GDP

~acro-economic Inflation rate calculated from GDP deflator

I

LABOR-USIMEX

Labor cost
Labor cost

IN=-=P

Stability

SALINAS

Policy

Stability

Relative unit labor cost, US/Mexico

I
I

Mexico's unit labor cost

Mexico's real net exports

-

Mexico's external debt government and private

-

Policy variable dummy

- 1 Salinas is President
- 0 otherwise

I

Note : Where applicable, all variables are in millions of constant US$,
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IV. Base Model

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

-

Hypothesis

Real GDP growth (GROWTH) is expected to have a positive
impact on FDI. This is because a high growth rate will
attract MNCs that are seeking to expand into new and growing
markets.
Inflation (INF) discourages FDI in that it increases the cost
of production and eats into the profits that a MNC may hope
to repatriate. A high inflation rate also slows the real GDP
growth rate and erodes the purchasing power of Mexican
consumers.
Relative labor cost (LABOR US/MEX) is expected to have a
positive impact on FDI. MNCSthat have already decided to
invest in this region are presumably hoping to gain access to
one or more of the markets in this region (i.e. the United
States, Canada and Mexico). These MNCs have the option of
locating their production facilities in the United States,
Canada, or Mexico. In making this decision, relative unit
labor costs clearly is an important consideration. Production
costs in the United States and Canada are not significantly
different. Since the United States is the largest source of
FDI in Mexico, I chose to compare its (rather than Canada's)
unit labor cost with Mexico's. This is also more consistent
with the Caves1 theory that "domestic" (United States) vs
foreign production costs are important. Even if the FDI is
from outside the United States (such as the European
Community), United States/Mexico labor costs are the relevant
costs to be considered because MNCs that choose to locate in
this region compare production costs in the US (or Canada)
with production costs in Mexico. As LABOR US/MEX increases,
Mexico's labor costs are becoming relatively cheaper, thus
increasing FDI.
LABOR is an alternative measure of production cost. The LABOR
variable takes only Mexico's productivity adjusted labor
costs into account. As Mexico's labor cost increases, FDI
should decrease.
The expe'cted sign of Net Exports (NET EXP) is uncertain. On
the one hand, continued high trade dezicits can result in
restrictions on foreign exchange transfers. This inhibits the
ability of the MNC to repatriate profits. The government may
also attempt to reduce imports by devaluing the local
currency or by restricting the imports of intermediate goods
that the MNC depends on. This discourages FDI. Also a trade
deficit results in a lower exchange rate. Although this makes
imports of intermediate goods more expensive, it also makes
the country's exports more competitive in world markets.
Foreign investors often find this aspect of a lower exchange
rate appealing. As such, the ultimate effect of a high trade
deficit is ambiguous.
External debt (DEBT) is expected to be negatively related
to FDI. A large debt level increases the probability of
default. This is an indication of the economic and political
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instability and as suchi should discourage FDI.
V. Base Model

-

Results

The empirical model was regressed using Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS). Two separate models are regressed. Model A uses
includes all variables discussed in the hypotheses section except
LABOR. This is because LABOR and LABOR US/MEX are alternative
measures of prodaction costs. As such,-they are used
interchangeably. The data are time series, from 1970-1990. All
data have been extracted from the World Bank's World Tables
1992. The results are summarized in Table 2.

I

TABLE 2 : OLS REGRESSION ANALYSIS

t

INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES

EXPECTED
SIGN
MODELA

MODELB

GROWTH

INF

LABOR-USJMEX

LABOR

NET-EXP

(1.6086)
SALINAS

CONSTANT

+
-221.407

1328.379

R-SQR

0.787

0.675

ADJ R-SQR

0.710

0.588

First, Model A is discussed. ~esidesLABOR US/MEX, all of
the variables are significant. The GROWTH variaEle has the
largest coefficient. It is also significant at the alpha = .10
level. As hypothesized, the GBP growth rate is important in
explaining FDI to Mexico. The pattern of FDI and GROWTH in Graph
1 supports this result. The INF variable is also statistically
significant and turned out as predicted.
The P a r k P l a c e Economist

The NET EXP variable turned out to be negative, This
supports thetheory that a high trade deficit is an indication of
economic instability. Evidently, MNCs weigh the risk of
devaluation, foreign exchange restrictions and import
restrictions more heavily than the advantages associated with
exporting from a country with a more competitive exchange rate.
Only the relative labor cost variable (LABOR US/MEX) is not
significant at the alpha = .10 level. This may be-because in
recent years, while the US is still the largest investor in
Mexico, significant portions of its FDI have been coming from
other parts of the world as well. This may cause the results to
be somewhat distorted. From Graph 3, it appears that until the
late 70s, there was a positive relationship between FDI and
LABOR-US/MEX. The relationship seems to break down after that.
- -

I

-

-

--

Graph 3 : FDI vs LABOR-USJMEX
Mexico, 1971-1990
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The data do not suggest a strong positive relationship between relative labor
costs and FDI. From 1982, the positive relationship s e e m to break down. This
indicates that a comparison of labor costs between the US and Mexico may not
be appropriate.
- -

.

j

The sign for the external debt variable (DEBT) did not turn
out as expected. However, the size of the coefficient is also
small. I suspect that net exports (NET EXP) and external debt
(DEBT) are closely related. I had inteEded that they proxy the
same thing - stability. As such, it may be more appropriate to
leave DEBT^ out of the equation. The regression explains 71.0286%
of FDI flows to Mexico.
Model B is a variation of Model A. LABOR is used instead of
LABOR US/MEX. Based on the results of MODEL A, the DEBT variable
is drEpped. LABOR turned out to be negative and significant at
Spring 1994

the alpha = .O1 level4. The GROWTH variable is insignificant. All
other variables turned out as expected and are statistically
significant.
Observe that all of the variables in the Model A and Model B
are purely macro-economic and stability variables. It is clear
from the hypotheses that there are sound economic reasons for
including these variables into the model. These economic
variables do a fairly good job explaining FDI flows to Mexico.
However, from the literature search, it is clear that we must
also take policy incentives and political factors into account in
order to get a more complete picture of what is really going on.

Graph 4 : FDI vs LABOR
Mexico, 1971-1988

Year
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It is quite obvious that there is an inverse relationship between FDI and unit

labor costs. This is a reasonably good proxy for the importance of production
costs.

VP. Model Includins Policy Variable

Dornbusch claims that currently, one of Mexico's critical
policy issues is "how to generate confidence in the economy" (p.
313). This captures the essence of what the Salinas
administration is trying to do. The only way Salinas can achieve
his economic goals is to instill confidence in both domestic and
foreign investors that economic and political conditions in
Mexico guarantee a stable flow of returns on their investments.
The Park Place Economist

Ih order to achieve this goal, the Salinas administration has,
among other things, offered more competitive tax rates to MNCs.
Mexico has also, in recent years, relaxed its foreign ownership
restrictions. The recent North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) between the United States, Canada and Mexico has also
stimulated a lot of confidence in Mexico. I needed to come up
with a variable that reflects these changes and captures the
effects of the return of investor confidence in Mexico.
The expanded empirical model is essentially the same as
Model B. The only difference is that a new variable, SALINAS is
included into the equation. Various approaches to modeling policy
incentives were considered. Initially, I had considered using tax
rates on MNCs and foreign ownership restrictions. However, I had
trouble obtaining data for these measures. Upon consultation with
Dr. Dornbusch, it was confirmed that most of these data simply
are not available. Dr. Dornbusch suggested that a dummy variable
for the years Salinas has been in power will probably capture
most of the effects that I am trying to model. After all, what I
am basically trying to measure is expectations.
The SALINAS variable is a dummy variable consisting of 1 for
the years Salinas has been president (1989 and 1990) and 0 for
all the other years. Salinas was inaugurated in August, 1988.
However, the "Salinas effect" is expected to be lagged for two
reasons. Firstly, the changes the Salinas administration has
brought about did not occur overnight. These things take time.
Secondly, it also takes time for MNCs to gather information
regarding these reforms. A lot of time and resources are involved
before an MNC can react to the changes implemented by the Salinas
administration. A few MNCs may even want to wait for awhile
before they have confidence in the ability of the new government
to carry out these changes. As such, the SALINAS variable has 1s
for 1989 and 1990. Clearly, the SALINAS variable is expected to
have a positive impact on FDI.
The expanded empirical model is estimated as follows :
FDI = a + b * GROWTH + c * LABOR + d * NET-EXP + e * INF +
f * SALINAS + error.
Table 1 summarizes the definition of variables. All previous
hypotheses apply. The new variable, SALINAS is expected to be
positively related to FDI. The SALINAS variable represents the
return of investor confidence in Mexico brought on by all the new
policy incentives implemented by Salinas.
VII. Expanded Model

-

Results

Table 3 summarizes the results of the OLS regression for the
expanded model. The results of the Model A and Model B are also
tabulated for comparison. The models are described as follows:
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TABLE 3 : OLS REGRESSION ANALYSIS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE : FDI
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES
GROWTH

EXPECTED
SIGN
MODELA

+

INF

LABOR-USIMEX

+

+1-

DEBT

SALINAS

CONSTANT

MODEL A
MODEL B
MODEL C

-

MODELC

2955.511
(1.6096)

2170.306
(1.0047)

2970.515
(1.7644)

-650.279
(2.4695)

-417.126
(1.6414)

162.941
(0.6226)

-732.583
(3.3223)

-28.401
(0.1038)

-0.36
(3.3042)

-0.293
(3.3975)

425.279
(1.1241)

LABOR

NET-EXP

MODEL B

-0.265
(2.7061
0.006
(I .6086)

+

830.836
(3.3467)
-221.407

1328.379

29.379

R-SQR

0.787

0.675

0.819

ADJ R-SQR

0.710

0.588

0.755

Base model.
Revised base model. Excludes DEBT and uses EABOR
instead of LABOR US/MEX.
MODEL B + SALINA~variable or the expanded model.

In model C, all the signs turned out as expected. Everything
except inflation (INF) and unit labor cost (LABOR) is
statistically significant at the alpha = .lo level. The SAEINAS
variable is statistically significant even at the alpha = .01
level. Its coefficient is also large. This suggests that Salinas
has managed to do a lot for investor confidence in Mexico. In
fact, the Salinas effect has been so large that apparently it has
swamped even the effect of Mexico's low unit labor cost (LABOR).
The LABOR variable was statistically significant in Model B but
in Model C, it is not significant. By and large Salinas' policies
appear to have been successful. If reliable data were available,
The Park Place Economist

it would be interesting to examine the impact of specific
studies.
The fact that the inflation variable (INF) is statistically
insignificant in the expanded model (Model C) can be explained by
the inclusion of the SALINAS variable. This is because both
variables measure expectations. As such, the SALINAS variable
must have picked up most of the variation caused by expectations.
The fact that GDP growth rates switched from being
insignificant (MODEL B) to significant (MODEL C) indicates that
the GROWTH variable performs much better in conjunction with the
SALINAS variable. There may be some multicollinearity5.
Model C has an adjusted r-square of 0.754. Model B's
adjusted r-square is -587. This tells us that purely economic
factors cannot completely explain FDI in Mexico. Clearly, policy
incentives and investor confidence in Mexico's political and
economic stability should not be overlooked.
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The results of my research suggests that the determinants of
FDI in Mexico are both economic and political. Investor
confidence in the political and economic stability of the country
is an important factor. Often, there is no clearly defined
distinction between a "political variable" and an "economic
variable". The two are too inter-related in too many ways. As
such, the Salinas administration has the unenviable task of
getting both the politics and economics right in order to attract
FDI. At this stage, it appears as though their policies are
having a measurable impact on their ability to attract FDI.
I believe that one of the main reasons Salinas has been so
successful is that he has managed to structure a very attractive
incentive package for foreign investors. Salinas has managed to
get the message across that Mexico is an attractive place to
invest. A promising avenue of future research would be an
assessment of the effects of specific policies on FDI.
Unfortunately, the data for such a study are not available.
Hopefully, as research in this area receives more attention,
reliable and comprehensive data sources will become available.
A shortcoming of this study is that it fails to capture a
more long-term perspective of the recent developments in Mexico
on FDI patterns in Mexico. Of particular interest would be an
evaluation of the overall impact of NAFTA on FDI in Mexico. Since
the agreement has only recently been signed and will not fully
take effect for a number of years, such a study cannot be
undertaken for a few years yet. The Mexican - United States
Canadian free trade zone promises to be one of the most dynamic
and exciting economic regions in the world. It is also
potentially a rich source of valuable economic research,
particularly in the area of FDI.
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ENDNOTES
1. Political and economic stability are very closely related.
Even in industrialized countries like the US, whether a president
is successfully re-elected for a second term depends on the
economy's performance. In less developed nations, economic
hardship can bring about political unrest. Political instability
also hampers economic growth, As such, the terms "political
stability" and "economic stability" will often be used
interchangeably.
2. The regression results are as follows :
L-US = -49.604 + 0.0255xYear
Adjusted R-square = -958
0.056l*Year
Adjusted R-square = .828
L-Mex = 112.564
where L US is unit labor cost for the and L-Mex is unit
labor cost for Mexico.
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3. Refer to Graph 2 for the graphical relationship between FDI
and DEBT.

4. Refer to Graph 4.
5. Since the multicollinearity -- if it exists, is not a serious
problem here, no attempt has been made to deal with it.
*-
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